

DECENTRALIZED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NIGERIA: PLURAL POLICING, REGIONAL & STATE POLICING, AND COMMUNITY SECURITY AS STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, KIDNAPPING AND VIOLENT ATTACKS

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ABSTRACT

The Federal Government's deduction of N500bn from May 2026 Federation Account Allocation Committee FAAC revenue for "national security emergency intervention", alongside the desertion of Owa Onire, Kwara State and Operation Hadin Kai's sector-based successes in Borno, confirms Nigeria's security crisis is structural, not fiscal. This paper argues that combating terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, and violent attacks requires moving from centralized emergency spending to a decentralized security architecture built on five pillars: 1) Plural Policing, 2) State Policing with regional coordination, 3) Community Security with stakeholder governance, 4) Intelligence-Led Policing including dual-use material control, and 5) Architectural Security. Drawing on Routine Activity Theory, Social Disorganization Theory, Broken Windows Theory, Ostrom's Polycentric Governance, and Akinade's 2004–2025 security frameworks, the paper demonstrates that asymmetric threats thrive where the state is distant and elites are unaccountable. Using current empirical cases from News Express June 2026 including N175m ransom payments, Zamfara bandit attacks, and Abuja court terrorism convictions, the paper recommends amending the National Park Service Act using the 2006 Yankari precedent, establishing State Forest Security Coordination Centres with regional integration, mandating community stakeholder boards with elite oversight, and redirecting N500bn from emergency cash to structural transition capital.

Keywords: Plural Policing, State Policing, Regional Security, Community Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, Kidnapping, Violent Attacks, Intelligence-Led Policing, Forest Governance, Nigeria

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On 19 June 2026, The Punch Newspaper reported that N500bn was deducted from May 2026 FAAC revenue before distribution to the Federal Government, 36 states, and 774 Local Government Areas to fund a “national security emergency intervention”. That same week, Owa Onire, Kwara State was reported deserted due to bandit attacks, and Operation Hadin Kai in Borno State repelled coordinated Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks while rescuing nine civilians including three children from the Mandara Mountains.

Since May 2023, the Tinubu administration has increased defence budgets, procured military hardware, and repeatedly pledged that security is a “prerequisite for economic growth and social stability”. FAAC allocations have risen monthly: N1.89tn February 2026, N2.04tn March, N2.26tn April, N2.3tn May 2026. Despite fiscal expansion, attacks on communities, mass kidnappings, and assaults on security formations persist.

This paper argues the gap is architectural. Centralized control of security assets that states and Local Governments must defend but cannot manage creates a “responsibility-capacity gap”. The N500bn emergency fund risks becoming another fiscal transfer without structural reform unless tied to devolution, plural policing, and accountability. The objective is to propose a decentralized security architecture that integrates plural policing, state and regional policing, and community security to combat terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, and violent attacks.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Plural Policing Theory

Bayley and Shearing (2001) advanced “nodal governance”, arguing that security is co-produced by multiple actors: state police, private security, community vigilantes, traditional institutions, and regional outfits. Akinade (2004, 2017) operationalized this for Nigeria through coordination frameworks for NPF, NSCDC, vigilantes, and hunters.

Application: Operation Hadin Kai combines military kinetic operations with civilian Joint Task Force and hunters. State Forest Security Coordination Centres should replicate this structure.

2.2 State Policing and Subsidiarity

Section 4(7) of the 1999 Constitution grants states residual powers over public order. Kidnappers operate within a 72-hour ransom window. State police deployed at Local Government level can establish checkpoints and profile suspects faster than federal units deployed from Abuja.

2.3 Regional Security Coordination

Regional outfits such as Amotekun, Community Network Guards, and Ebube Agu provide meso-level coordination. Boko Haram and ISWAP move across Borno-Yobe-Niger borders. Regional coordination prevents “jurisdiction shopping”.

2.4 Community Security and Social Disorganization Theory

Shaw and McKay (1942) demonstrated that crime rises where communities lack social cohesion and informal social control. The desertion of Owa Onire represents collapse of collective efficacy. Akinade (2020) adds that community security requires neighbourhood organization based on participation, legitimacy, and accountability.

2.5 Routine Activity Theory

Cohen and Felson (1979) posit crime occurs when a motivated offender, suitable target, and absent guardian converge. Table 1 applies this to kidnapping and banditry.

Table 1: Routine Activity Analysis of Kidnapping and Banditry

Element	Current State	Intervention via Decentralized Architecture
Motivated Offender	Unemployed youth and elite sponsors	60-30-10 revenue model and prosecution of logistics couriers
Suitable Target	Isolated schools, poorly lit roads	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design lighting and school fencing
Absent Guardian	Less than one ranger per 10 km ²	FSCC sector patrols achieving one guardian per 2 km ²

2.6 Broken Windows Theory

Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued visible disorder signals absence of control. Abandoned construction sites and deserted settlements signal “no one is in charge”. Emergency funds must finance visible order.

2.7 Polycentric Governance

Ostrom (1990) demonstrated multiple centers of decision-making produce more resilient management than centralized control. Federal National Park Service sets standards, states manage operations, Local Governments handle liaison, communities provide intelligence.

2.8 Akinade’s Specialized Security Frameworks

Akinade (2020), Community Security, Neighbourhood and Plural Policing: Principles And Practice

Principle: Community security requires neighbourhoods to organize plural policing nodes with principles of voluntary participation, legitimacy, and accountability.

Application: FSCC Community Liaison Desk must establish “Neighbourhood Security Committees” in each sector, trained on Akinade’s principles to prevent vigilante excesses.

Akinade (2019), Policing Terrorism, Insurgency, Kidnapping and Weapons of Mass Destruction For International Peace and Security

Principle: Asymmetric threats require “anticipatory policing” through intelligence and control of dual-use materials.

Application: Operation Hadin Kai’s recovery of herbicides, salt, and phones validates Akinade’s warning. FSCC Intelligence Desks must profile fertilizers and chemicals as precursor indicators.

Akinade (2013), Security Challenges, Urban Violence and Terrorism

Principle: Urban violence links to rapid urbanization, poor environmental design, and absence of community policing.

Application: Desertion of Owa Onire demonstrates the rural-urban continuum when forests become ungoverned.

3.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

3.1 Fiscal Paradox: N500bn deduction reduces fiscal space for states and LGAs hosting insecurity while they bear displacement costs.

3.2 Scale-Capacity Mismatch: National Park Service manages 22,206 km² with less than one ranger per 10 km².

3.3 Elite Complicity: NPF parades include traditional rulers allegedly supporting kidnapping networks.

3.4 Emergency vs Preventive Logic: Emergency funds respond after attacks while preventive security requires local intelligence and CPTED.

4.0 METHODOLOGY

Doctrinal legal analysis of 1999 Constitution, Land Use Act 1978, National Park Service Act 2004, ACJA 2015. Policy analysis of FAAC data Feb-May 2026, NPS 2024 Report, NPF Crime Database. Case studies: Yankari 2006 devolution, Old Oyo 2026, Operation Hadin Kai 2026, Owa Onire 2026, Brazil Amazon, Dual-Use Interdiction Borno 2026. Current media evidence from News Express June 2026.

5.0 CASE STUDIES AND CURRENT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Table 2: Case Study Matrix

Case	Threat Type	Governance Model	Outcome	Lesson
Yankari 2006	Poaching, banditry	State devolution + community partnership	Tourism revenue increased	Devolution works
Old Oyo 2026	Kidnapping, robbery	Federal control only	Persistent attacks across 11 LGAs	Scale mismatch
Operation Hadin Kai 2026	Terrorism, insurgency	Sector command, plural policing	9 civilians rescued	Sector model effective
Owa Onire 2026	Banditry	Weak community governance	Community deserted	Early warning ignored
Zamfara 2026	Banditry	Centralized response	6 farmers killed, 10 injured	Absent guardians
Borno 2026	Terrorism logistics	Intelligence-led targeting	Herbicides, salt, phones recovered	Precursor control viable

5.1 Current Empirical Evidence, June 2026

Kidnapping Burden: Hakeem Baba-Ahmed reported spending N175m to secure nephew's release, illustrating private ransom costs from centralized failure.

Rural Violence: Bandits killed 6 farmers in Zamfara, validating Broken Windows Theory and need for FSCC sector patrols.

Judicial Deterrence: Abuja court sentenced three terrorists to death; Edo announced special courts for kidnappers. Supports certainty of punishment via decentralized prosecution.

Media & Perception: FG urged media to "take terrorists off front pages". FSCC Community Liaison should manage verified reporting per Akinade (2020).

Financial Crime: Police busted N7.7bn telecom fraud syndicate, confirming financial intelligence role in Akinade (2019).

Student Safety: Robbers killed final-year student; UNN security detained teachers. Validates Akinade (2013) on urban violence and CPTED need.

6.0 ANALYSIS

6.1 Plural Policing against Terrorism: Military + NSCDC + vigilantes + hunters under FSCC command. Akinade (2020) legitimacy prevents militia drift.

6.2 State/Regional Policing against Kidnapping: Proximity + cross-state pursuit closes jurisdictional gaps.

6.3 Community Security against Insurgency: Mandara Mountains rescue by community members formalized via Neighbourhood Security Committees.

6.4 Dual-Use Control: Monitor fertilizers, chemicals, high-capacity phones per Akinade (2019).

6.5 Architectural Security: CPTED audits remove hiding places per Akinade (2013).

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Legislative: Amend National Park Service Act 2004 using Yankari precedent. N200bn for devolution transition.

7.2 Institutional: Establish FSCC with Command, Intelligence/Precursor Watch, Operations, Community Liaison, Technology desks. N150bn for equipment.

7.3 Operational: Sectorize parks into 4-6 sectors per Operation Hadin Kai model. Daily patrols, weekly community meetings.

7.4 Community: 60-30-10 revenue sharing. Establish Neighbourhood Security Committees per Akinade (2020). N75bn for projects + elite oversight.

7.5 Architectural: N75bn for CPTED audits, lighting, road redesign in forest-border communities per Akinade (2013).

7.6 Dual-Use Control: Precursor Watch Units with NSCDC/Customs monitoring agro-chemicals per Akinade (2019).

8.0 IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP 2026-2028

Phase 1, 0-6 months: N200bn. Pilot Old Oyo FSCC, sectorization, drones/GIS, CPTED audits, Neighbourhood Committees.

Phase 2, 6-18 months: N225bn. National Assembly amendment, train 5,000 vigilantes, prosecute 10 elite complicity cases.

Phase 3, 18-36 months: N75bn. Implement 60-30-10 model, replicate FSCCs, publish transparency reports.

9.0 CONCLUSION

Terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, and violent attacks are defeated when the state is present, communities are empowered, regions coordinate, and elites are accountable. The N500bn FAAC deduction must shift Nigeria from emergency firefighting to architectural building. Plural policing provides redundancy, state/regional policing provides proximity, community security provides intelligence and legitimacy, intelligence-led policing provides anticipation, architectural security removes opportunities.

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11.0 APPENDICES

Appendix A: Draft Amendment Clause for National Park Service Act 2004

Appendix B: FSCC Organizational Chart

Appendix C: CPTED Audit Checklist

Appendix D: Code of Conduct for Traditional/Religious Leaders

INSTITUTE OF SECURITY NIGERIA

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STATEMENT ON DECENTRALIZED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NIGERIA

Issued by: Barrister Adebayo Akinade, DFISN

Deputy President, Institute of Security Nigeria

Date: 19 June 2026

To: The President, Federal Republic of Nigeria

The National Assembly

State Governors and Speakers of State Houses of Assembly

Chairmen of 774 Local Government Areas

Traditional and Religious Leaders

Civil Society, Media, and Development Partners

The Institute of Security Nigeria notes with concern the Federal Government's deduction of N500bn from May 2026 FAAC revenue for "national security emergency intervention" at a time when communities like Owa Onire, Kwara State have been deserted by bandits, and citizens report spending N175m privately to secure kidnapped relatives.

We affirm that security is a collective responsibility requiring structural reform, not repeated emergency spending. After reviewing current data, court convictions, and field operations including Operation Hadin Kai's sector successes, the Institute proposes the following policy position:

1. Devolve Security Responsibility:

The National Assembly should amend the National Park Service Act 2004 to allow state governments to assume primary management of parks within their territory under federal standards, following the successful 2006 Yankari model. States and Local Governments must have legal authority over assets they are required to defend.

2. Institutionalize Plural and Community Policing:

Each state hosting forests and border communities must establish a State Forest Security Coordination Centre with five functional desks: Command, Intelligence including Precursor Material Control, Operations, Community Liaison, and Technology. Community security must be organized through

Neighbourhood Security Committees based on principles of voluntary participation, legitimacy, and accountability.

3. Ensure Elite Accountability:

Traditional and religious leaders must adopt a binding Code of Conduct with independent oversight. Any complicity in kidnapping, terrorism logistics, or land fraud must attract immediate suspension and prosecution under ACJA 2015. The Institute welcomes recent judicial actions sentencing terrorists to death and establishing special courts for kidnappers.

4. Redirect Emergency Funds to Transition Capital:

The N500bn should be restructured: 40% for devolution transition and equipment, 30% for sectorization and intelligence technology, 15% for community development via 60-30-10 revenue sharing, 15% for architectural security and CPTED audits in vulnerable communities.

5. Protect Public Perception through Truth:

While acknowledging national security concerns, we urge government and media to prioritize verified reporting of security progress and community resilience. Countering misinformation requires trusted local information channels managed by FSCC Community Liaison Desks.

Nigeria's security architecture must shift from centralized emergency response to decentralized prevention. When communities are empowered, states are capacitated, regions coordinate, and elites are accountable, terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, and violent attacks will decline.

The Institute of Security Nigeria stands ready to provide technical support for training, policy drafting, and implementation monitoring through our National Office at University of Lagos.

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